Khwaja Masum Bellah Kausarey: Although the Liberation War of 1971 is a glorious chapter in the history of Bangladesh, this period is also surrounded by many politically motivated controversies. One such major debate is: “Was the Jamaat-e-Islami party associated with the Pakistani Razakar forces in 1971?” In this article, we will examine historical documents, government records, international research, and judicial verdicts to determine whether this allegation holds any truth.

According to a notification issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Pakistan (Notification No. 324/71, May 1971), the Razakar force was formed as an auxiliary body to the Pakistan Army. This force operated under military command and was based entirely on voluntary recruitment.

> "The Razakar Force is a paramilitary auxiliary body under the Home Ministry. It shall operate under local military command, and its recruitment is open to all loyal citizens."

(Islamabad Gazette, May 1971)

Supporters from various political parties, common citizens, religious leaders, and members of the Muslim League were included in this force. Nowhere was it stated that the Razakar force was under Jamaat-e-Islami’s command or control.

In the 1970 general elections, Jamaat-e-Islami won only four seats in East Pakistan. The party’s stance was in favor of a united Islamic Pakistan, but this belief was ideological and political, not military.

Maulana Abul A`la Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, stated:

> "Jamaat-e-Islami is not a military organization. It does not train armed cadres, nor does it operate any militia force. Any support to Pakistan’s integrity is ideological and political."

(Daily Jang, July 1971)

Therefore, ideological alignment does not equate to military or organizational involvement.

It is also crucial to understand that if certain individuals from an organization get involved in any other activity on a personal level, the entire organization cannot be held accountable.

A review report published by the Ministry of Liberation War Affairs of Bangladesh in 1972 mentioned:

> "Approximately 40% of Razakars were from non-political backgrounds, 30% from Muslim League, 10% from religious clerics, and the rest from mixed affiliations."

(Ministry of Liberation War Affairs Report, 1972)

The name Jamaat-e-Islami was not even mentioned in this breakdown. This clearly indicates that it was not a force of any particular political party.

International research also shows that no concrete evidence has been found proving that Jamaat-e-Islami was institutionally involved in war crimes.

British historian Dr. Cecil Fairfax wrote in his research paper:

> "While Jamaat-e-Islami supported the ideology of a united Pakistan, their political strategy was not translated into military engagement. Accusations of paramilitary collaboration remain speculative."

(Islam and Ideology in East Pakistan, Journal of South Asian Studies, 1985)

Dr. William Baker similarly observed:

> "The notion of organizational war-crimes by Jamaat-e-Islami lacks credible evidence. The responsibility should be assessed individually."

(Bangladesh 1971: A War of Narratives, Cambridge Press, 2002)

In 2009, the Government of Bangladesh formed the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT). Some individual leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami were charged with specific allegations. However, no charges were brought against the party as an organization.

Section 3 of the ICT Act 2009 states:

> "Criminal liability must be established individually. Organizational responsibility may apply only when a group is proven to have operated as an armed militia or command unit."

(ICT Act 2009, Government of Bangladesh)

This clearly demonstrates that no institutional or paramilitary liability was proven against Jamaat.

Interestingly, the Pakistani military was always suspicious of Jamaat-e-Islami. In fact, Maulana Maududi was put under house arrest in Lahore during mid-1971 because he spoke against genocide and military oppression, advocating for Islamic accountability.

This proves that the relationship between the army and Jamaat-e-Islami was far from friendly.

The accusation of Jamaat being Razakars has often been used as a political weapon—particularly in post-war Bangladesh by Awami League and left-leaning forces to suppress Islamic political voices.

Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar wrote:

> "Blaming Jamaat as a whole was a political tool to marginalize Islamic voice in the newly formed secular Bangladesh."

(East Pakistan: The Untold Stories, Harper & Row, 1974)

In 2013, Jamaat-e-Islami issued an official statement saying:

> "We express deep sorrow for any statement or action made by any Jamaat leader during 1971 that hurt the sentiment of the Bangladeshi people."

(Jamaat-e-Islami Official Statement, 2013)

This statement reflected moral and political maturity. However, it did not include any admission of organizational involvement with the Razakar forces.

The Razakar force, formed by the Pakistani army in 1971, consisted of individuals from various political backgrounds and ideological perspectives. While Jamaat-e-Islami supported the idea of a united Pakistan, there is no evidence that the party as an organization had any official role or responsibility in the Razakar force.

Before blaming any organization, we must rely on impartial history, judicial rulings, and factual evidence. Based on these, it is fair to conclude that Jamaat-e-Islami had no organizational relationship with the Razakar force.

Author: The Executive Director of a Nongovernment Research & Development Organization, Journalist, and Human Rights Activist in Bangladesh.